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T h e r es t i l ls e e m st ob es o m ec o n f u s i on about the consequences of nor-
malisations in the optimal taxation litterature. We claim that: 1) Normal-
isations do not matter for the real solution of optimal taxation problem.
2) Normalisations do matter for good characterisations of the solutions
to optimal taxation problems. Whereas the ﬁrst point is uncontroversial,
the second one is less well understood.
By postponing the normalisation of consumer prices, we detail how
normalisations of consumer prices aﬀect the characterisation of optimal
commodity taxes, derive the preferred characterisation, and show how it
depends on the normalisation.
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There still seem to be some confusion about the the role of normalisations in
the optimal taxation literature, even with perfect competition, complete markets
and full information. We set out to clarify this matter, and claim that, with all
income generated by endowments:
1. Normalisations do not matter for the real solution of optimal taxation
problem.1
2. Normalisations do matter for (good) characterisations of the solutions to
optimal taxation problems.
The ﬁrst point is uncontroversial. The second one is also fairly obvious, but, as
far as I can see, not acknowledged in the literature. Indeed the standard opinion
seems to be that since the real solution is independent of normalisations, so
should characterisations, although I have not found anyone saying this explicitly.
The distinction is clariﬁed by an analogy with the view (analogous to the
normalisation) of a (3-dimensional) object (analogous to the solution). For such
objects, it is clear that:
1. The view does not change the object.
2. The view is important for seeing the essential properties of the object.
In our case the homogenity of demand in consumer prices introduces one degree
of freedom in choosing the “view” on the solution.
We support this distinction by showing in detail how normalisations aﬀect
the characterisation, and arrive at a canonical (preferred) normalisation.
The above is our main point. But it might also be wortwile to repeat that
one also needs to distinguish between diﬀerent kinds of taxation of endowments
(usually only leisure):
1. Taxation of own consumption of initial endowments (e.g. leisure).
2. Taxation of sales of initial endowments (e.g. labour).
In standard optimal taxations models, untaxed own consumption of initial en-
dowments is usually what makes ﬁrst-best unattainable, and thus a basic trait
of the models. Untaxed sales of initial endowments is only a normalisation of
consumer prices, though, as we will argue, the canonical one for interpretations.
More speciﬁcally, we claim that to get the best interpretation, consumer prices
should be normalised so that the tax income from initial endowments is zero
at the optimum. This is of course a straightforward generalisation of the stan-
dard case, where leisure is the only endowment and labour is untaxed. Using
this normalisation, we arrive at a generalised inverse elastisity rule, generalising
slightly the characterisation in Deaton (1979). The rule says that one should
tax complements to the initial endowments harder. The intuitive explanation is
that doing this is an indirect way of introducing a tax on the own consumption
of endowments.
1This presupposes demand and supply functions which are homogenous of degree 0 in
consumer and producer prices. If not, Munk (1978) and Dixit and Munk (1977) show that
normalisations also matter for the real solution.
2For other purposes other normalisations might be better. E.g., when it comes
to solving the problem, the proposed normalization is useless, as it generally
presupposes the optimum.
The assumption of perfect competition is important, for, as noted by Gab-
szewicz and Vial (1972), with imperfect competition the price normalization
also matters for the real solution of the taxation problem. Additionally, one
are usually not able to solve such general equilibrium models without making a
normalization.
In the following, after discussing the literature, we ﬁrst set up the commodity
tax model, then repeats the simple points concerning the second distinction
using the homogeneity of demand. Finally, we detail how normalisations of
consumer prices aﬀect the characterisation of optimal commodity taxes, and
arrive at our canonical normalisation for interpretations.
1.1 Some examples from the literature
Is not the main distinction above well-known? In one sense it is, as most peo-
ple use the canonical normalisations and the resulting intuitive interpretations.
People explicitly discussing normalisations in an optimal taxation context, how-
ever, tend to miss at least the ﬁrst distinction, as I will try to show.
Except for the interpretation issue, this article build on the work of the
people we criticise here, as the model presentation is only a slight variation of
that of Deaton (1979) and Auerbach (1985). The variation is that we use the
economically more intuitive compensated willingness to pay function instead of
their distance function, and deﬁne what we call endowment elasticities, which
helps the interpretation.
Auerbach Auerbach in his excellent handbook article (1985, p. 89) clearly
notes the diﬀerence between the two types of taxation of leisure. He seems to
disagree to our main point about the canonical normalisation for characterisa-
tions, however. Thus in the case with an endowment of leisure only, while we
argue that the canonical normalisation is to make sales of leisure untaxed, as this
gives the most intuitive interpretation, he warns (on p. 90) that making leisure
untaxed leads to a “loss of distinction between untaxable and untaxed goods.”
As mentioned, this only happens if one does not discriminate between own con-
sumption of leisure (untaxable by model setup) and sale of leisure (untaxed
due to the normalisation). Indeed, Auerbach seems (implicitely) to require that
characterisations should be independent of the normalisation, at least he pro-
vides such a characterisation, which then becomes weaker than necessary, as we
will see.
Deaton Even Deaton (1981, p. 1256) seems confused about the role of nor-
malisations. Discussing the characterisation of optimal taxes (equation (15)
below) he states:
Note the special place occupied by good 0, leisure. ... the asymmetry
is due to the numeraire role of labor (or leisure). Since leisure is
untaxed, government revenue is implicitly measured in labor units
so that by taxing complements with the revenue good, taxation is
rendered easier. In general, the government will presumably wish to
3purchase goods other than labor and this would lead to a diﬀerent
tax rule. For example, a king who must pay a tribute of oxen to a
neighboring conqueror would do well to levy relatively high taxes on
goods complementary with oxen.
Stern Stern (1986, p. 298) claims that “there have been a temptation “to
elevate the innocent normalization ... into something of of real substance”. He
then points out the error in Deatons above claim. He is, however, not quite
precise about what is going on as he states that
The crucial reason for the central role of complementarity with
leisure in the results concerning the optimum proportion of tax in
price is that there is an endowment of leisure which cannot be taxed
in this second-best problem.
The root of the problem is as we have said that own consumption of leisure
is untaxed. That labor (sales of leisure) is untaxed is an innocent normalisa-
tion. Furthermore, the fact that normalisations are irrelevant for the solution
of the optimal taxation problem does not imply that they are irrelevant for the
characterisation of the problem.
It looks like Stern does not discriminate between the task of understanding
the principles of taxation and the task of solving a taxation problem. The
ﬁrst task one needs an intuitive characterisation, where normalisations matter,
whereas for the second task normalisations does not matter (except maybe for
the speed of ﬁnding the solution) — but characterisations usually does not matter
either. This is diﬀerent from the case with explicit analytic solutions, where one
wants to arrange the solution in an easily interpretable way.
Stern also lists some other questionable reservations against Deaton’s ap-
proach. One is that the symmetry between goods and factors are lost on Deatons
approach. This is true, but that symmetry is replaced by the more fundamental
one between positive and negative net trades. Another is, if I understand him
correctly, is that the duality results underlying Deaton’s approach presuppose
positive lump-sum income. This is wrong, as the duality results only presup-
poses positive (full) income, and this is for all practical purposes fulﬁlled without
lump-sum income. Finally, he claims that it is hard to measure or even deﬁne
the endowment of leisure. But the measurement of the endowment of goods is
more a problem when it comes solving an optimal taxation problem than for
understanding the principles of taxation. For the last task, I think Deatons’s
approach is the preferred one.
Fullerton Fullerton (1997), discussing the double dividend hypothesis, is quite
close to our position. He shows clearly how the double dividend hypothesis (that
the pollution tax should exceed marginal environmental damages) depends on
the normalization used. He seems, however, less inclined to recommend the
normalisation where labour is untaxed for interpretations, despite it giving the
natural double dividend hypothesis.
Myles In contrast to most of the above authors, Myles (1995, p. 122), is also
confused about the diﬀerent kinds of taxations of leisure, but here we consentrate
on our main point:
4It has been shown that in an economy with constant returns to scale,
consumer and producer prices can be normalised separately and that
the standard procedure is to make one good the numeraire and set
its consumer and producer prices equal. This normalisation also has
the eﬀect of setting the tax on that good to zero. The latter fact is
clearly seen to be of no consequence whatsoever since the zero tax
is just a result of the normalisation rule. In particular, the zero tax
carries no implications about the nature of the good nor about the
ability to tax that good. This follows since the good with zero tax
can be chosen arbitrarily from the set of available goods.
The “no consequences whatsoever” might be interpreted as saying that inter-
pretations should be independent of normalisations, thus missing our ﬁrst dis-
tinction. He continues (on p. 123):
Particular examples of this are found in Corlett and Hague (1953)
‘By taxing those goods complementary with leisure, one is to some
extent taxing leisure itself’ (p. 26) .... This, of course, is a false
interpretation.
Here he seems to infer that interpretations based on a speciﬁc normalisation is
illegitimate, and thus our ﬁrst distinction is lost.
2 The optimal commodity taxation model
We use the standard optimal commodity taxation model with one price-taking
individual,2 except that we allow for initial endowments, x ≥ 0, of all goods.3
Assume ﬁxed ﬁrm (producer) prices, p.4 With quantity taxes, t,o nm a r k e t
transactions, x−x, and no lump sum tax, prices to individuals (consumer prices)
are p = p+t, and the income of the individual (at these prices), m = m+p0x,
where m =0is exogenously given income. The problem for eﬃciency is as usual
that own consumption of initial endowments is untaxed.
Remark 1 We talk about ﬁrm prices instead of producer prices and prices to the
individual instead of consumer prices, to emphasise that these are all prices to
ﬁrms and individuals, and not only prices of the goods they produce or consume.
Remark 2 With our tax system, ti > 0, means that good i is taxed if the
individual is a net demander of good i and that it is subsidised if the individual
is a net supplier of it.
Assume that the public sector maximises the utility of the individual given an
exogenously given tax requirement, T.N o r m a l i s eﬁrm prices by setting income
2This is of course unrealistic. It is usually justiﬁed by saying that one are interested in
eﬃciency results in an economy with many individuals, but this is not eﬃciency in the Pareto
sense.
3We also assume a complete set of markets, price-taking actors and no proﬁt. Without
these assumptions, even the real solution to the problem might depend on the normalisation.
4This corresponds to a (constant scale) Leontief technology. The assumption of ﬁxed ﬁrm
prices can be replaced with a linear technology without any consequences for the results. The
only diﬀerence is that then we also have to make the ﬁrm price normalisation at the prices in
optimum, as we do for the individual price normalisation below.
5at ﬁrm prices, p0x =1 .T h e nT is the tax requirement as a share of the income
at ﬁrm prices. Also let v(p,m) be the indirect utility function and x(p,m) the
demand of the individual. The governments problem is then:
V (p,m,T)=m a x
t
v(p,m) s.t. t0 (x(p,m) − x) − T ≥ 0( µ).( 1 )
The marginal social utility of (exogenously) income to the individual, Vm =
vm + µt0xm, and the marginal social utility of increasing the tax income re-
quirement, VT = −µ.T h u s µ is the marginal social utility of reducing the
public tax requirement, and θ =( µ − Vm)/µ is the value of transferring one
pound (exogenously) from the individual to the public, in units of the public
budget. All these concepts are evaluated at consumer prices.
Before characterising the solution, we discuss diﬀerent normalisations of con-
sumer prices.
2.1 Normalisation of consumer prices
With all income generated by endowments, x, demand, x(p,p0x), is homoge-
neous of degree 0 in consumer prices, p. Thus we can scale (normalise) the
consumer prices, p,w i t h o u ta ﬀecting demand. This homogeneity is often used
to set the consumer price on one good equal to its ﬁrm price, so that the tax
on this good is 0. We illustrate the consequences of diﬀerent choices with an
example.
Example 1 With a (constant scale) Leontief technology, choose units so that
all goods have ﬁrm price 1. There are two goods, i =1 ,2 (without endowments)
in addition to leisure (good 0). Assume that with leisure untaxed (the canonical
normalisation, as we shall see), the tax on good 2 is larger than that on good 1,
i.e. t2 >t 1. The consumer prices are then p0 =( 1 ,1+t1,1+t2)
0
.
What happens if we instead choose good 2 as untaxed, by dividing consumer
prices by 1+t2? We get new consumer prices, p2 =( 1
1+t2, 1+t1
1+t2,1)0.B u tt h e n
p2
0,p 2
1 < 1, thus we have a subsidy on good 1 and tax on good 0. There is a tax
on leisure since the price of leisure is smaller to the consumer than the ﬁrms.
The result in the case with good 2 as untaxed is hard to interpret: To obtain
the required public revenue, one should subsidise good 1! In contrast, the case
with leisure untaxed is more comprehensible, with two taxed goods. I think
this example already points to the importance of the normalisation for a good
characterisation. We get brieﬂy back to the example at the end of the paper.
Tax systems In our context, deﬁne a tax system as the abstract entity which
are invariant under diﬀerent consumer price normalisations. Choosing a nor-
malisation then only give an instance of the tax system.
I can then restate my main claim as follows: At least for interpretation pur-
poses, the canonical instance of a tax system, is the one making the individual’s
income equal to one at the optimum.
As noted by Fullerton (1997), for implementing such a tax system, other
considerations, like which goods it is feasible to tax, might make another nor-
malisation more appropriate.
63 Characterising optimal commodity taxes
As mentioned, we postpone the consumer price normalisation, to get a clearer
view of it’s eﬀect. The ﬁrst order condition of our taxation problem, (1), with




p + µ(x − x + xpt)=0.
With initial endowments, Roy’s theorem and the Slutsky equation are vp =
−vm(x−x)0 and xp = xH
p −xm(x−x)0,w h e r exH is the compensated demand.
Inserting from this into the ﬁrst-order condition gives
−vm(x − x)+µ
¡
x − x +
¡
xH




Collecting the terms with x − x, dividing by µ and inserting for Vm and θ,w e
get the Ramsey rule:
θ(x−x)+xH
p t = 0.( 2 )
A direct interpretation of the Ramsey rule is that an equal relative increase
in all tax rates (at optimum) should give an equal relative reduction in the
compensated quantity of all non-endowed goods.5 This interpretation, how-
ever, does not convey much information about the implied taxes rates as these
are quite implicit in the characterisation. But some stronger assumptions give
simpler interpretations.
The (compensated) inverse elasticity rule Assume that leisure (good 0)i s
the only endowment, and no compensated cross price elasticities between goods,
except towards leisure. Then Ramsey rule, (2), gives the inverse elasticity rule












The ﬁrst form of this rule is mostly used, but the second gives the best inter-
pretation. It says that one should tax relative complements to leisure harder.
The Corlett-Hague rule Assume that leisure (good 0) is the only endow-
ment and that there are only two other goods. In this case, the Ramsey rule,















On the right hand side, only the ﬁrst terms are diﬀerent in the nominator
and denominator. Thus the interpretation is again that we should tax relative
complements to leisure harder.8
5The characterisation gets somewhat more complex for endowed goods.
6Here Elba =( b/a)(da/db) is the elasticity of a with respect to b.
7Dalton and Sadka (1979) gives a more direct generalisation of the Corlett-Hague rule than
t h eo n eb yD e a t o nw h i c hw ea d v o c a t e ,b u ti nt h e i rc a s et h e r ea r es t i l lo n l yt w ot a x e dg o o d s .
8In contrast to the assumptions of the inverse elasticity rule, the assumptions of the Corlett-
Hague rule allows complements to leisure.
7The importance of the common interpretation of the second form of the in-
verse elasticity rule and the Corlett-Hague rule is argued by Sandmo (1987).
The argument below, essentially due to Deaton (1979), gives a general charac-
terisation of optimal commodity taxes with the same intuitive interpretation.
Thus the argument outdates Sandmo’s (1976, p. 46) remark: “Elasticity for-
mulae become very complicated in the general case and provide little intuitive
insight into the structure of taxation.”
Auerbach (1985, p. 92) notes that if one interpret xH
i as excess demand, the
Corlett-Hague rule does not change even if leisure is not good 0 (the numeraire).
Our point is that the interpretation of the Corlett-Hague rule only makes sense
if sales of leisure is untaxed, and that this therefore is the canonical choice of
normalisation. Taxing more heavily relative complements with leisure makes
sense, as the untaxed own consumption of leisure is the reason for not obtaining
the ﬁrst-best in this model. To give an intuitive explanation of why one should
tax relative complements with an arbitrary consumer good, taken as numeraire,
on the other hand, seems close to impossible. As we will see, it is only with
leisure untaxed, that we can generalize the Corlett-Hague rule, in the sense that
we get a general characterisation with essentially the same interpretation.
3.1 Inverting the Ramsey rule
We use the Antonelli matrix, which is the derivative of the (compensated) mar-
ginal willingness to pay function, to invert the Ramsey rule. First, however, we
recall these concepts.
3.1.1 The (compensated) marginal willingness to pay
First introduce prices, q = p/p0x, scaled so that income is one. With these
prices, q, the indirect utility function can be written U∗(q)=v(p/p0x,1).
The (compensated) willingness to pay function (or indirect expenditure func-
tion), e∗, is the least one is willing to pay for quantities x, to keep utility at or
below u,i . e . : 9
e∗(x,u)=m i n
q q0x subject to U∗(q) − u ≤ 0.
The solution to this problem, qH(x,u), is the (compensated) marginal willing-
ness to pay for x (given utility level u) or the (compensated) inverse demand
for x.B yt h ee n v e l o p ep r o p e r t y ,e∗
x(x,u)=qH(x,u). We draw a picture of the
problem for a given level curve, U∗(q)=u. With prices on the axes, utility is








9Deaton and Auerbach actually use the equivalent distance function instead, but the will-
ingness to pay function is more intuitive.
8The (compensated) willingness to pay function is concave, homogenous of degree
1, and nondecreasing in x, and additionally continuous for x À 0,j u s ta st h e
expenditure function (in p).
Compensated demand, xH(p,u), and compensated marginal willingness to






This relation says that given prices p,w i t he x p e n d i t u r e1 to reach utility level
u,w eg e tb a c kt op by ﬁrst taking the compensated demand at these prices,
and then the compensated marginal willingness to pay, given this demand. If
expenditure to reach utility level u is diﬀerent from 1, we only get back to
original prices, scaled to expenditure 1.
T a k i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h ea b o v ee x p r e s s i o nw r t .p r i c e sp,w eg e tt h a tt h e
Slutsky matrix, xH
p ,a n dt h eAntonelli matrix, qH
x ,a r egeneralised inverses, i.e.
(p0x)qH
x xH
p = I − qx0,( 6 )
where I is the identity matrix.
3.1.2 The inverse Ramsey rule
Let θ = θp0x.11 Multiply the Ramsey rule, (2), with p0x and use the deﬁnition
of θ to get
θ(x − x)=( p0x)xH
p t.
Left multiply by the Antonelli matrix, qH
x , using the generalized inverse prop-




p t =( I − qx
0)t.
As qH(x,u) is homogenous of degree 0 in quantities x, qH
x x = 0. Inserting
from the public budget constraint, (x−x)0t = T. This gives the (unnormalised)
inverse Ramsey rule:12
t =( T + x0t)q + θqH
x x.( 7 )
Before proceeding, we introduce some deﬁnitions.
3.1.3 Endowment elasticities







k (τx +( 1− τ)x,u)
∂τ
|τ=1 .
This is the elasticity of the (compensated) marginal willingness to pay for good
k with respect to an adjustment of consumption (from the optimum x)i nt h e
direction of the endowments, x.13
10A simple proof is given in an appendix. Another proof of (6) below is given in Salvas-
Bronsard, Leblanc and Bronsard (1977).
11We get back to the interpretation of θ.
12This is essentially Auerbach’s (1987) formula (6.6). Thus, so far there is nothing new.
13In the standard case with an endowment only of leisure, the endowment elasticity of a
good is simply the elastisity of the (compensated) marginal willingness to pay for that good
wrt. the quantity of leisure.























= qkxk be the income share of good k, evaluated at the marginal
willingness to pay at optimum, and ιβ =
P
j βjιj the average (compensated)
endowment elasticity, with the income share weights.
More on θ Right multiplying (7) by x,u s i n gt h a tq0x =1 , we get an expres-
sion for the marginal value of transferring one pound (exogenously) from the






The quadratic form in the denominator of (9), however, equals the average






































We saw above that θ is the value of transferring one pound exogenously, at
consumer prices, from the individual to the government. Then θ = θp0x is the
value of transferring one pound exogenously, at ﬁrm prices, from the individual
to the government. This is so, since with our ﬁrm price normalisation, the
income at ﬁrm prices, m = p0x =1 , while income at prices to the individual,
m = p0x.T h u sm = p0xm,s odm/dm = p0x.
The marginal eﬃciency loss of taxation By its interpretation, θ looks
like a natural measure of the marginal eﬃciency loss of taxation. As pointed
out by Håkonsen (1998), however, this is problematic, as one would like such a
measure to be independent of the consumer price normalisation, and θ is not.15
But from (9), θ is independent of the consumer price normalisations and is
therefore a natural measure of the marginal eﬃciency loss of taxation. Again,
with our (canonical) normalisation below, θ = θ,s ow i t hthis normalisation, θ
also is also a measure of the marginal eﬃciency loss of taxation.
14The inequality follows as e∗(x,u) is concave i x,t h u sqH
x is negative semideﬁnit.
15Håkonsen then proceeds to deﬁne the (total) eﬃciency loss by means of a pair of dual
optimal value functions for the optimization problem.
103.2 The normalisation and inverse characterisation
We are now ready for our (canonical) normalisation, being a straightforward
generalisation of the standard practice with leisure as the only endowment, and
untaxed labour.
Normalise consumer prices by setting income at the optimal consumer prices
equal to one, p0x =1 . Then, at optimum, the initial endowments are a nontaxed
(composite) good, i.e. t0x =0 .T h e na l s op = q, and (7) simpliﬁes to the inverse
Ramsey rule:
t0 = Tp0 + θx0qH
x . (11)
On component form, (11) is:



















Thus the public tax requirement (as a share of income at ﬁrm prices) is a basic
tax rate. Deviations from this base tax rate is for each good proportional to its
endowment elasticity.
Call a good k an endowment substitute if ιk < 0,a n da nendowment com-
plement if ιk > 0. The basis tax rate should then be raised for endowment
complements and lowered for endowment substitutes.16 The intuition is clear:
A tax on own consumption of endowments removes the eﬃciency loss. Thus a
tax on endowment complements is an indirect way of taxing own consumption
of endowments, thereby reducing the eﬃciency loss. Taxing endowment substi-
tutes, on the other hand, only increases the own use of untaxed endowments.
This is of course the same intuition as one get both from the second form of the
inverse elasticity rule, (3), and the Corlett and Hague rule, (4), above. It does,
however, avoid the restrictive assumptions of both these characterisations.
3.2.1 Auerbachs alternative














In this characterisation especially the term for the tax value of endowments, t0x,
is hard to interpret, as the other new term, (p0x)
−1, is only a proportionality
factor. In example 1, it is this term which explains why we get negative tax rate
under the last normalisation, as it is negative.
Formula (13) is essentially formula (6.7) in Auerbach (1985) (except that we
have introduced the endowment elasticities), obtained by setting an arbitrary
tax rate equal to 0. Auerbach, however, gets around the problems caused by the
tax value of endowments, by looking at the diﬀerences between the relative tax
16With only endowments of one good, this is essentially Hicks’ (1956) notions of q-
compements and q-substitutes with respect to this good.











−ιβ¢ (ιk − ιj) v ιk − ιj. (14)
This, however, is a weaker characterisation, than the generalized inverse elastisity
rule, (12). Auerbach has obviously seen the possibility of using our canonical
characterisation. Thus is looks like the reason he use (14) instead is that he
thinks that characterisations (and interpretations) should be independent of
choice of normalisation, as (14) is, except for the proportionality factor.
3.2.2 Only one endowment
With endowments of only one good, 0 (say leisure), from (8) using symmetry,
the (compensated) endowment elasticity of good is the elasticity of (compen-













In this case β0 =1 .T h u sf r o mt h ed e ﬁnition:

















The departure of the tax rate on good k from the base tax rate is for each good
proportional to the (compensated) elasticity of the marginal willingness to pay
wrt. the price of leisure.
A comparison with the inverse elasticity rule The generalized inverse
elasticity rule, (15), is similar to the second form of the inverse elasticity rule, (3),
except that it involves the elasticity of the (compensated) marginal willingness
to pay (i.e. inverse demand) wrt. leisure, whereas the standard inverse elasticity
rule involves the inverse value of the elasticity of (compensated) demand with
respect to the price of leisure.
Appendix: The generalized inverse property
Here, we verify the generalized inverse property used in the main text, using
the duality between the compensated direct and inverse demand. We state the
basic result for demand correspondences, with respect to income normalized
prices and quantities.
Given a utility level u,d e ﬁne the compensated demand correspondence, cu,
by x ∈ cu(q) if qx ≤ 1, U(x) ≥ u and for all x0 such that U(x0) ≥ u, qx0 ≥ 1,
and the compensated inverse demand correspondence, c∗u,b yq ∈ c∗u(x) if
qx ≤ 1, U∗(q) ≤ u and and for all q0 such that U∗(q) ≤ u, q0x ≥ 1.T h e
17This is Deaton’s (1979) formula (51).
12following straightforward proposition states that the two concepts are dual in a
simple way.
Proposition 1 Assume monotone preferences. Then x ∈ cu(q) if and only if
q ∈ c∗u(x).
Proof. ⇒:A s s u m ex ∈ cu(q). To show that q ∈ c∗u(x).T r i v i a l l y qx ≤ 1,
so we need to show ﬁrst that U∗(q) ≤ u and secondly that if U(q0) ≤ u,t h e n
q0x ≤ 0.
1. Assume U∗(q) >u .T h e ns i n c eU∗(q)=s u p x {U(x)|qx ≤ 1},t h e r ei sx0
such that U(x0) >uand qx0 ≤ 1. Hence by monotonicity there is x00 such
that U(x00) >uand qx00 < 1, contradicting x ∈ cu(q).
2. Let U(q0) ≤ u, and assume that q0x > 1. Then by monotonicity, there is
q00 such that U(q00) <uand q00x > 1.S i n c eU(x)=i n f q {U∗(q)|qx ≥ 1},
then U(x) ≤ U(q00) <U(q)=u, contradicting x ∈ cu(q).
⇐:T h i si se s s e n t i a l l yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t .
If both the above correspondences are single-valued, we essentially have the
compensated demand and inverse demand functions, xH(q,u) and qH(x,u),
ie. x ∈ cu(q) can be written x = xH(q,u) and q ∈ c∗u(x) can be written
q = qH(x,u). In this case, a consequence of the proposition is the generalised
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